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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The viticulture sector represents a conspicuous part of the Catalan 
agricultural and agro food sector. While wine production in Catalonia has been 
increasing markedly over the first half of the 2000s, prices that grape producers 
receive have steadily declined threatening their standard of living. This has raised 
social and political concerns and calls for a better understanding of its causes. Our 
analysis attempts to comprehend the sources of such price crisis. 
Methodology – A Delphi survey was conducted during 2005 among a panel of 27 
wine sector experts.  
Findings – We find that experts agree in considering wine surplus and imperfect 
price transmission as the main causes determining low farm-gate prices in the 
Catalan wine sector.  
Keywords: Delphi analysis, wine sector, price transmission.  
Paper type: research paper.  
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Introduction  
 
As is the case with other European countries, the viticulture sector represents a 
conspicuous part of the Catalan agricultural and agro food sector. Wine making is an 
essential part of the economic and social identity of Catalonia and constitutes an 
important aspect of the region’s landscape. While wine production has been increasing 
markedly over the first half of the 2000s, prices that grape producers receive have 
steadily declined threatening their standard of living. The decline in farm-gate prices 
contrasts with the stability of consumer prices. The economic situation of the wine 
sector has raised social and political concerns and calls for a better understanding of its 
causes.  
 
When market mechanisms work smoothly, prices appear to be the main variable 
determining resource allocation, typically paying back marginal production costs. At the 
same time, prices are the primary mechanism by which different levels of the food 
marketing chain are related. The degree to which price changes are transmitted along 
this chain is usually a reflection of the level of competition within the market. Research 
on vertical price transmission within the food marketing chain has repeatedly reported 
imperfections such as asymmetries in this process (Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Serra and 
Goodwin, 2003; Peltzman, 2000). The literature also agrees on the fact that market 
conditions are largely important to understand how market imperfections work. Our 
analysis aims at characterizing the food marketing chain for wine products in Catalonia 
by quantifying the trade flows occurring within this chain. By doing so, we hope to 
provide useful insights concerning the process of price formation. Also, we attempt to 
determine the causes for the relevant increase in wine production within the last years 
and assess to what extent this increase constitutes a problem for the sector.  
 
This study is divided in five main sections. The next section briefly describes the 
Catalan wine sector. Section three presents the methods employed. Section four reports 
the main results. The paper concludes with a summary of the results and the formulation 
of policy recommendations. 
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The Catalan wine grape production sector 
 
Worldwide, almost 8 million ha are assigned to grape production and as Table 1 
exhibits, the total area has slightly increased during the last decade (by about 0.8%). In 
contrast, the European grape area, which represents about 44% of worldwide grape area, 
has decreased by approximately 4% in the 1999-2006 period. Following the same trend, 
the Spanish grape production area has declined by around 0.5%. The Spanish grape 
sector is important as it represents about 34% of all European grape production area, 
with almost 1.2 million hectares. Previous studies suggest that the European and 
worldwide wine grape markets qualify as being saturated and mature (Calderon and 
Blanco, 2005; ICEX, 2006).  
 
Table 1.  Worldwide, European, Spanish and Catalan harvested grape area and wine 
production (x1,000 hl). 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Grape area  
(1,000 ha) 
World 7,864 7,885 7,893 7,955 7,953 7,919 7,930 7,924 
Europe 3,553 3,588 3,547 3,515 3,490 3,468 3,439 3,410 
Spain 1,180 1,237 1,235 1,202 1,207 1,200 1,180 1,174 
Catalonia  59.4 65.4 64.3 64.9 65.4 67.8 62.9 - 
Wine 
production  
(1,000 hl)   
World 281,039 280,415 264,730 257,864 264,730 298,170 278,300 283,600 
Europe 177,360 173,459 156,822 150,847 154,285 178,107 165,700 170,400 
Spain 33,723 41,692 30,500 33,478 41,843 42,988 35,300 39,500 
Catalonia  3,081 2,992 2,863 3,105 3,388 3,988 3,768 3,512 
Sources: World, Europe and Spanish data from International Organization of Vine and Wine (OIV); 
Catalan data for grape area from Spanish Ministry for Agriculture (MAPA) and Catalan Institute of 
Statistics (IDESCAT). Catalan data for wine production from Fondo Español de Garantía Agraria 
(FEGA) and MAPA.   
 
Catalonia represents roughly 5% -63,000 ha- of the Spanish grape production area 
(Table 1). Although the Catalan grape area is not especially relevant in magnitude, it is 
in quality. The Catalan viticulture sector is clearly specialized in quality wines, with 
around 95% of the vineyard area being devoted to produce “Quality Wine Produced in 
Specific Region” (Q.W.P.S.R.). Among Catalan quality vineyards it is possible to 
identify as much as eleven Protected Designations of Origin[1] (PDOs). Among them 
Penedès is the most prominent in terms of vineyard area, production and sales.  
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Annual Catalan wine production is around 3 million hectoliters, a 9% of Spanish 
wine production (Table 1). PDOs represent around 90% of Catalan wine production. 
Despite a slight decline in output in 2001, especially for PDOs, a considerable increase 
takes place in the subsequent years. Catalan wine production patterns by PDO have 
changed over time. While PDO Penedès, Costers del Segre and Empordà have increased 
their relative importance, PDO Tarragona, Conca de Barberà and Terra Alta have lost 
relevance (Table 2). About 70% of the wine produced in Catalonia is devoted to white 
wine, a fact that can be explained by the relevance of Cava production (sparkling white 
wine) in Catalonia. Consistently with the evolution of total wine production, both white 
and red wine output increased during the first half of the 2000s.  
 
Table 2. Catalan wine production by PDOs (hl)  
 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/204 2004/2005 
Alella 8,751 8,258 3,657 7,475 8,137 *  7,018 
Catalunya  * 197,541 371,800 338,353 299,128 299,088 335,895 
Conca de Barberà 51,306 27,526 78,807 52,782 35,154 30,605 22,018 
Costers del Segre 69,247 46,960 131,609 82,794 87,019 102,214 119,082 
Empordà-Costa Brava 36,091 58,740 47,611 62,000 60,087 57,019 59,959 
Montsant  * * * 48,414 32,968 67,800 50,996 
Penedès 450,726 540,325 587,935 455,172 523,451 518,413 468,865 
Pla de Bages 10,991 12,320 12,000 10,950 11,800 12,700 10,900 
Priorat 6,413 3,443 4,732 4,875 1,857 16,766 4,117 
Tarragona 501,658 497,030 453,447 316,543 391,500 439,492 454,833 
Terra Alta 295,954 298,575 301,196 310,984 268,941 69,545 65,617 
Source: unpublished data from Incavi (Catalan Institute of Wine and Vineyard)   
 
Trends in consumption show a different pattern as Figure 1 illustrates. Although 
worldwide consumption has increased since the end of the 1990s (OIV), Spanish wine 
consumption has decreased and concentrated on PDO wines. Catalan wine consumption 
has experienced a much softer decrease and has also focused on PDO wines. Moreover, 
Spanish consumption is more centered on non Catalan PDOs such as Rioja and Ribera 
del Duero (AcNielsen, 2006a and b). Another remarkable issue arising from Figure 1 is 
that Catalan production exceeds consumption by far.  
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“Take in Figure 1” 
 
The fact that production surpasses consumption explains the positive Catalan wine 
trade balance. In particular, wine imports within the last years (1999-2005) have been 
around 38 million euros, whereas exports have represented about 340 million euros 
(Cámaras de Comercio, 2007). Currently, however, exports are growing more slowly 
than imports. This can be explained by changing consumer preferences and increased 
competition from other countries. Catalonia imports mainly from France, Portugal, 
Italy, Chile and Germany and exports to Germany, the USA, the UK and Sweden.  
 
The excess production over consumption together with an increase in imports has 
had clear effects on prices. While consumer prices have not experienced noteworthy 
changes, farm-gate prices have significantly declined (Figure 2). This is consistent with 
Bukenya and Labys (2007) who confirmed a weak relationship between Spanish wine 
prices and wine inventories. The fact that a reduction in farm-gate prices does not 
translate into lower prices for wine, suggests the existence of imperfect price 
transmission within the food marketing chain (Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Serra and 
Goodwin, 2003; Peltzman, 2000). It may also suggest a scenario of inelastic demand 
and supply curves for wine (Fogarty, 2004). In such a scenario, the lower costs of grape 
production may not result in a reduction in wine prices. That is, the margin enjoyed by 
downstream channel members may automatically rise.  
 
Paradoxically, low grape prices have not involved a reduction in grape production, 
which would have contributed to re-equilibrate the market. On the contrary, producers 
seem to have responded to low market prices by increasing output levels. This is 
consistent with producers aiming at stabilizing their income. Fogarty (2004) stated that 
countries with higher per capita levels of wine consumption and higher relative market 
shares have a more inelastic demand, being France, Spain, Portugal and Germany the 
most relevant examples. The decline in farm-gate prices coupled with inelastic demand 
and supply curves for wine has squeezed wine grape growers’ margins and threatens 
their standard of living.  
 
 5
Spanish wine grape growers’ family farm income diminished from about 1,045 €/ha 
in 2003 to 685€/ha in 2005 (MAPA, n.d.). Aggregate Spanish data are considered 
representative of the Catalan pattern, as the economic situation during the period studied 
was quite similar in all Spanish regions. Our analysis aims to improve the understanding 
of the reasons that have led to the present crisis situation, as well as the causes that 
justify an imperfect price transmission within the marketing chain. To do so, it is 
important to better comprehend the overall functioning of the food chain and identify 
the causes of production increases during the first half of the 2000s. A Delphi survey is 
used to assess these issues. 
 
“Take in Figure 2” 
 
Data and methods  
 
As noted above, in a perfectly competitive market, the price of the final product 
should result from adding the marginal costs incurred by agents at each level of the 
marketing chain. However, market imperfections such as information asymmetry, 
market power, menu costs and search costs in local markets (Serra and Goodwin, 2003) 
may lead to imperfect transmission of prices along the chain. In agricultural markets 
this has been reported to be a serious concern. The recent evolution of wine grapes and 
wine prices suggest that imperfect price transmission may also be present within the 
Catalan wine marketing chain. 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of price formation, it is necessary to have a 
deeper knowledge of the overall functioning of the marketing chain. Since there are no 
available statistical data on this issue, the Delphi method has been considered 
particularly relevant in providing the required information. The Delphi method has been 
successfully applied to examine different issues in a large variety of disciplines such as 
health (Milholland et at., 1973; Schoeman and Mahajan, 1977; and Oranga and 
Nordberg, 1993), policy (Critcher and Gladstone, 1998), and agriculture. In this latter 
discipline, the Delphi method has been used to examine Spanish olive oil exports (Mili 
and Rodríguez, 2001)[2], the marketing of organic products (Padel and Midmore, 2005), 
the Finnish agricultural policy (Rikkonen et al., 2006) or the biotechnology and agro-
food sector (Agrafiotis and Vagianou-Angelaki, 1999). 
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The Delphi survey technique was first introduced in the early 1950’s and was 
initially oriented to deal with technical topics such as reaching a consistent opinion for a 
complex issue (Turoff, 2002). Rather than an objective method to measure effects and 
causes of a specific phenomenon, it provides qualitative information that cannot be 
elicited through other methods. The objective of the Delphi analyses carried out is to 
reveal all the possible reasons that could explain current low farm-gate prices within the 
Catalan wine sector by achieving a consensus among experts (Turoff, 2002).  
 
The survey was performed during 2005. The selection of the panel was acomplished 
following expert advice. The Polytechnic University of Catalonia has long been 
involved with studying the Catalan wine sector. Faculty and extension specialists were 
consulted and provided a list of agents. Experts on the wine sector from the Department 
of Agriculture of the Catalan Government also provided a directory of possible 
respondents. From these lists, we selected a final panel of 27 experts, all of them 
professionals belonging to different levels of the wine supply chain (wine grape 
growers, wineries, wholesalers and retailers). We also selected professionals from the 
Catalan agricultural public administration, regulatory councils and the University.  
 
Three rounds were enough to obtain both the information needed as well as to 
increase the degree of consensus among experts. As for the first round, a preliminary 
questionnaire was sent and returned by mail. After this first reply, a second 
questionnaire was developed and completed also by mail. Finally, a third phase was 
carried out by means of expert face to face interviews, in order to contrast the results 
obtained in the second step. Respondents included about 63% of the panel and 
represented all supply chain stages, public authorities and the University.  
 
The first-round survey was based on open questions aiming to identify the main 
problems related to the sector. Based on the reported replies the second Delphi 
questionnaire was built. This second-round consisted of a closed questionnaire where 
the respondents were asked to carry out quantitative and qualitative evaluations of 
different issues in order to better define and make suggestions to solve the main 
problems identified in the first round. Finally, second-round replies were ordered and 
structured using a third-round where respondents were presented with the obtained 
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results and offered the chance to change their responses according to the information 
available. To determine a stopping criterion for the Delphi analysis, we measure 
stability of respondents over successive rounds of the Delphi following the method 
proposed by (Sheibe et al., 2002). This method consists of comparing the distributions 
of opinion between rounds. A maximum of a 15% change level is chosen to represent a 
state of equilibrium. Since no significant change levels in third-round responses were 
observed, a fourth questionnaire appeared as unnecessary.    
 
Results and discussion  
 
a. First Round: Main wine sector problems expert assessment.   
 
Since the wine supply chain is slightly complex and in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the problems affecting the sector, in the first-round experts were 
inquired about the specific problems related to the different stages of wine production. 
In particular, they were questioned about the problems regarding wine grape growing, 
wine production, the structure of the sector, wine marketing within the domestic market, 
wine exports and, finally, other general problems. Results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Respondents identify the lack of payment differentiation between grapes for PDO 
and non-PDO wines as being the main problem related to grape production, likely to be 
originated by over-production of grapes for PDO wines. Other deficiencies related to 
the national vineyard restructuring plan, a supply management policy, are identified. 
Experts consider inadequate restructuring schedules and grape varieties as the main 
shortcomings related to this plan. Finally, respondents believe that the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), in its present form, is unable to preserve supply-demand 
equilibrium. 
 
The utilization of concentrated and rectified grape must is one of the main problems 
of wine production, and it may allow middlemen in the marketing chain to pay reduced 
prices for wine grapes. Increases in wine imports follow in relevance amplifying the 
excess supply problem. As exhibited in Table 3, the main structural deficiencies of the 
wine sector are a lack of interprofessional agreements, a low degree of vertical 
integration, and an insufficient entrepreneurial dimension for international competition. 
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Moreover, respondents believe that there exist too many intermediaries within the wine 
supply chain and that margins within the chain are excessive.  
 
Wine marketing within national markets suffers from four main problems: 
restaurants’ high margins and prices, hard competition from other Spanish and 
international wines, low and seasonal demand for Catalan wines both in Catalonia and 
in Spain and finally poor national marketing structures. Another shortcoming is the 
existence of too many Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) in Catalonia. The fact 
that Catalan wines are not sold under a common quality brand makes it more difficult 
the commercialization in Spain and in foreign countries relative to other Spanish PDOs 
such as Rioja comprising wider production areas. Barrère (2007) identifies that in 
Spain, Italy and France competition and segmentation is basically among PDO wines 
instead of between PDO and other wines. Therefore, the main objective of this 
certification, differentiation by quality, loses significance.  
 
Finally, export limitations are also identified in Table 3. The low promotion of 
Catalan wines in foreign markets represents, according to experts, the main shortcoming 
affecting the sector which is related to the lack of collaborative agreements among 
different PDOs. Poor market structures, a slow down in export expansion and lack of 
knowledge of foreign markets have also been considered by experts as key problems for 
international wine marketing.  
 
First-round survey results identified three main reasons that have induced a decline 
in farm prices while consumer prices remain constant: excess production, deficient 
marketing structures and imperfect price transmission along the marketing chain. In 
order to gain a deeper understanding of these problems a second-round Delphi 
questionnaire was designed. As for excess production, we directly inquire experts on the 
issue. With regards to price transmission and marketing structures we characterize the 
marketing chain so as to identify possible causes of why prices are not moving 
smoothly.   
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Table 3. Expert assessment of the main problems of the wine sector (the qualifications 
go from 1 -not important to 10-very important) 
Source: own source 
 
b. Second and third rounds 
 
b.1. Characterizing the supply chain. 
 
The first objective of this second round is to provide a better understanding of the 
wine supply chain. To do so, we attempt to quantify trade flows for both red and white 
Grape production main problems  Average (Std.) 
Lack of differentiated payment for grapes for PDO wines 7.4 (2.7) 
Vineyard restructuring plans are not suitable concerning varieties 6.3 (2.3) 
Unsuitable moment for the application of vineyard restructuring plans  5.9 (2.7) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) unable to preserve supply-demand equilibrium   5.0 (1.9) 
Wine production main problems  Average (Std.) 
Use of concentrated and rectified grape juice in wine production  7.2 (2.7) 
Use of sugar in wine production  5.6 (2.4) 
Import of wine from other production zones  5.8 (2.9) 
Structural main problems  Average (Std.) 
Low development of contractual regimes that contribute to stabilize the market 6.9 (2.5) 
Poor vertical integration  6.8 (2.7) 
Low entrepreneurial dimension for international competition  6.4 (2.7) 
High margins  5.7 (2.4) 
Too much intermediaries 5.3 (2.1) 
Main marketing  problems – domestic market  Average (Std.) 
Restaurants: high margins and prices  8.1 (1.8) 
Price competition between Catalan wines and other wines from Spain and emerging countries   8.0 (1.6) 
Demand seasonality (Cava)  7.7 (1.9) 
Low demand in Spain  6.9 (2.8) 
Diluted image of Catalan wines within the Spanish market  6.8 (2.4) 
Poor marketing structures for domestic market   6.1 (2.3) 
Low demand in Catalonia  5.7 (2.9) 
Too many Protected Designations of Origin  4.2 (3.0) 
Main export Problems  Average (Std.) 
Low promotion of Catalan wine in foreign markets 9.0 (1.2) 
Lack of collaborative agreements among PDOs  for foreign markets competition  7.7 (2.8) 
Poor market structures  6.7 (2.5) 
Slow down in export expansion  6.6 (2.5) 
Ignorance of foreign markets  6.4 (2.1) 
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wines which follow different production processes and have different marketing chains. 
To that end, in the questionnaire a supply chain diagram with empty data was included 
in order to be completed (see Figures 3 and 4). Experts were asked to determine the 
percentage of output flowing to each different agent in each marketing level. According 
to their answers, wine supply chains can be characterized as follows.  
 
Catalan young red (white) wine is made from about 90% (88%) Catalan wine grape 
and 10% (12%) concentrated grape juice.  A 17% (19%) of this red (white) young wine 
will be diverted towards the production of non-PDO wines. Our panel of experts 
estimate that non-PDO red (white) wine produced in Catalonia is a blend of about 75% 
(79%) Catalan young wine and 25% (21%) from other origins. On the other hand, about 
83% (81%) of Catalan young red (white) wine is devoted to the production of PDO. 
From this, more than a 30% of the red wine is directed to an aging process and the 
remaining is consumed as bottled young wine with PDO. As for white wine, about a 
30% goes to an aging process, 18% is consumed as bottled young wine with PDO and 
the remaining 59% goes towards Cava (sparkling wine) production. 
 
“Take in Figures 3 and 4” 
 
On the basis of expert responses, it can be concluded that the Catalan red wine 
industry produces four key products: bulk wine without PDO (8%), bottled wine 
without PDO (13%), bottled young wine with PDO (54.5%) and finally aged wine with 
PDO (24.5%). On the other hand, the Catalan white wine yields five key products: bulk 
non-PDO wine (10%), bottled PDO and non-PDO young wine (18 % and 9% 
respectively), Cava (59%) and finally aged wine qualified as PDO (4%). 
 
Moreover, it seems clear that there are four main wine market destinations both for 
red and white wines. As we can see in Table 4, exports represent around 30-40% of total 
production in the region, domestic supermarket distribution represent about a 30%,  
while around 25% of Catalan wine is consumed in restaurants and more than 10% is 
sold in wine stores.   
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Table 4. Distribution of red and white wine by retail destination (%).  
  Exports Supermarket distribution 
Restaurant 
consumption 
Wine store 
sales 
Red 
wine 
Total 29.4 30.2 26.7 13.7 
In bulk (8%) 4.6 - 3.4 - 
Bottled and non-PDO (13%) 2.5 6.1 4.4 - 
Young and PDO (54.5%) 14.7 18 12.5 9.3 
Aged and PDO (24.5%) 7.6 6.1 6.4 4.4 
White 
wine 
Total 38.5 27.4 22.2 11.9 
In bulk (10%) 5.9 - 4.1 - 
Bottled and non-PDO (9%) 2.1 4.4 2.5 - 
Young and PDO (18%) 4.5 6 4.5 3 
Cava (59%) 25 16 10 8 
Aged and PDO (4%) 1 1 1.1 0.9 
Source: own source 
 
From both red and white wine diagrams, it is worth mentioning the quantity of wine 
that is redirected from non-PDO to PDO wine. Approximately 23% (25%) of red 
(white) wine that initially enters the non-PDO wine marketing chain is readdressed 
towards the production of PDO wine. This contributes to our understanding of the 
observed price behavior: while a portion of grapes enter the distribution channel as non-
PDO and thus receive lower prices than PDO grapes, they are finally used to produce 
PDO wines that will obtain higher retail prices. 
 
It is also important to emphasize the role of cooperatives within the Catalan wine 
sector. Following expert quantifications, around half of Catalan grape production is 
controlled by cooperatives. While cooperatives play an undoubtedly relevant role, 
affiliation in the wine sector is lower relative to other food products and countries. For 
example, almost 70% of the milk produced within the EU-15 is marketed through 
cooperatives (Foro Agrario, 2000). In 2003, four of the ten main European cooperatives, 
in terms of revenue, specialized in dairy. In contrast, no wine cooperative existed within 
the raking (Confederación General de Cooperativas Agrarias de la UE-COGECA, 
2005). The situation is not much different in Spain, where fruits, vegetables and olive 
oil cooperatives are abundant while wine cooperatives are scarce (COGECA, 2005).  
Spain had 625 wine cooperatives in 2003, not much compared to the 900 located in 
France, a direct competitor of Spain. Moreover, French cooperatives’ turnover per year 
is almost twice that of Spanish ones (COGECA, 2005).  
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Catalonia has around 77 wine cooperatives, which is 12% of all Spanish wine 
cooperatives (MAPA, 2004).  This is compatible with Catalan wine production, 
representing around 10% of Spanish production.  Low cooperative market shares 
coupled with an overall lack of marketing contracts within the wine sector involve 
reduced farmer negotiating power in price determination. Cooperatives can play a key 
role in marketing agricultural products by providing growers with a common database 
and by achieving economies of scale and thus lowering marketing and promotion costs. 
There is indeed a good experience with regards to cooperatives in the Catalan wine 
sector. The PDO Montsant, which was born in 2001, has been mainly promoted through 
cooperativism. Thanks to promotion strategies, the quality of Montsant wines is starting 
to be recognized outside Catalonia-almost a 70% of Montsant production is exported 
specially to Germany and the United States. Also in this sense, Garcia et al. (2002) 
explain that, for the Canary Island potato sector, vertical integration in agricultural 
cooperatives contributes to increase producer revenues by granting them participation to 
the added value during the commercialization process. From the expert’s standpoint, 
cooperatives are more relevant within the white wine than within the red wine chain. 
This can explain the higher stability displayed by white wine farm-gate prices relative to 
red wine (see Figure 2).   
 
 Finally, the role of supermarkets on price determination, which have more power 
than the one exerted by small shops and restaurants, must also be considered.  
Excluding exports, supermarkets distribute almost half of Catalan wine. Supermarkets 
may be more reluctant to reprice their products than small specialty shops since the 
costs of doing so are higher. Low farm prices may not be immediately transferred to 
consumers. Consequently, supermarket power may also contribute to explain why retail 
prices have remained more or less constant while farm-gate prices have diminished.  
 
b.2 Qualitative evaluation of the Catalan wine surplus 
 
This section aims to elicit qualitative information on the prospects and situation 
of the Catalan wine sector production surplus. In order to better characterize the 
situation and predict its future evolution, experts were asked to forecast the overall 
economic situation of the sector within the next five years. Moreover, they were also 
asked to qualify the production surplus situation as temporary or permanent. Finally, the 
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reasons that encourage excess supply in the Catalan wine sector were also identified 
(Table 5).  
 
With respect to the economic forecast within the next five years, experts agree in 
considering the white wine (60% of experts) and the Cava (more than 70% of the panel) 
sectors as quite stable sectors. However, some respondents point to moderate expansion 
or recession. In particular, around  20% (10%) of the panel believes that the Cava (white 
wine) sector will expand, while less than 10% (30%) predicts a recession. Agreement 
among experts is lower with regards to the economic forecast of the red wine sector. 
About 33% of the panel foresees a moderate expansion in the next future, 33% believes 
that the sector is stable, 20% predicts a moderate recession and finally a 13% foresees 
an important recession.[3] 
 
A majority of panel members (around 60%) define the current production 
surplus situation as permanent for white and red wines, more than 30% as structural and 
only 6% as temporary. There is, however, no agreement for the case of Cava: about 
29% of the panel considers the situation as being temporary, 39% as structural with a 
possible solution and finally 32% as permanent. Furthermore, experts consider it easier 
to deal with white wine than red wine surplus, since the first can be redirected -in bulk- 
to other European wine markets, reducing white wine stocks.   
 
Finally, we elicited from experts the causes of Catalan wine surplus 
differentiating between red wine, white wine and cava. A list of possible causes were 
presented to the experts and they rateed each proposition from 0 – not at all important to 
10 – very important. Table 5 presents the top ten surplus causes according to expert 
assessment. Interestingly, there was an agreement among expert panel members that the 
origins of production surplus are the lack of coordination and poor vertical integration 
in the overall Catalan wine sector.   
 
 14 
 
Table 5. Main expert assessed reasons for the surplus in the Catalan wine and cava sectors (From 0 - not at all important to 10 - very important).    
 
White wine Red  wine Cava 
      
Slow down in exports 5.9  
(2.9) 
Scarce government control of cooperatives and 
organizations 
5.9 
(3.1) 
Deficiencies in the control exerted by the 
Regulatory Council 
5.7 
(3.0) 
Increase in production in order to keep farm rents in 
a context of downward prices 
5.9 
(2.8) 
Deficiencies in the control exerted by the 
Regulatory Council 
6.0 
(3.0) 
Increase in production in order to keep farm rents in 
a context of downward prices 
5.7 
(2.9) 
      
Wine quality deterioration as a result of 
overproduction 
5.9 
(2.7) 
Low demand in nearby markets 6.3 
(2.5) 
CMO is not able to preserve supply-demand 
equilibrium 
5.7 
(2.6) 
      
CMO is unable to preserve the supply-demand 
equilibrium 
6.4 
(2.5) 
Wine quality deterioration as a result of 
overproduction 
6.4 
(2.7) 
Excess production goes to the detriment of quality 5.8 
(2.6) 
Low demand in nearby markets 6.4 
(2.7) 
CMO is not able to preserve supply-demand 
equilibrium 
6.4 
(3.4) 
Poor export marketing structures 6.3 
(3.2) 
Low supports from public policy 6.7 
(3.3) 
Low supports from public policy 6.5 
(3.3) 
Low supports from public policy 6.4 
(2.7) 
Poor export marketing structures 6.7 
(3.3) 
Poor export marketing structures 6.5 
(2.4) 
Lack of differentiated payment for quality grape 6.6 
(3.4) 
Yields above permitted levels as a result of scarce 
supply regulation 
6.9 
(2.4) 
Yields above permitted levels as a result of scarce 
supply regulation 
6.8 
(2.4) 
Yields above permitted levels as a result of scarce 
supply regulation 
7.1 
(2.4) 
Poor vertical integration 7.1 
(2.6) 
Poor vertical integration 7.1 
(2.6) 
Poor vertical integration 7.3 
(2.6) 
Wine sector lack of coordination 7.7 
(2.6) 
Wine sector lack of coordination 7.7 
(2.6) 
Wine sector lack of coordination 7.8 
(2.6) 
Source: own source 
Note: Values are expressed at the data means and standard deviations are in parenthesis 
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Excessive production due to soft supply regulation and the inability of the 
Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine to preserve market equilibrium are also 
considered as possible reasons for wine surplus. Other regulation-related causes are 
identified, such as low support from the government towards the wine sector and low 
public control of cooperatives and cellar management to ensure good oenological 
practices. Furthermore, export market limitations have also been highlighted by experts 
as a reason for wine surplus. Indeed, survey respondents reveal that the Catalan export 
marketing strategy is not effective enough and encounters difficulties when competing 
against other low-price quality wines such as Australian, Argentinean and Chilean 
wines. Finally, the tendency to increase production in response to price declines so as to 
maintain farm income has also been considered as an important factor. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The Catalan wine sector is currently immersed in a crisis situation characterized by 
excess production and low farm-gate prices. The tendency of farm-gate prices to decline 
contrasts with the stability displayed by consumer prices. This study has attempted to 
determine the underlying causes of this situation. Catalonia is one of the main European 
PDO wine producing areas and the evidence presented in this analysis can provide some 
insights relevant for further empirical and theoretical analysis. It is however important 
to note that since this paper is based on qualitative data, all the findings should be 
treated as indicative not conclusive. Further validation through large-scale surveys 
would be interesting for future research. Closely following the evolution of the wine 
sector during the next few years would help determine the future relevancy of our 
results and policy recommendations.  
 
First-round results from the Delphi study agree in considering excess production, 
deficient marketing structures and imperfect price transmission as the main causes 
determining low farm-gate prices in the Catalan wine sector. The second and third 
rounds of the analysis were carried out to provide a deeper understanding of both the 
motivating causes of excess production and the overall functioning of the marketing 
chain.   
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Results show that although marketing chains for white and red wines are different, 
they present similar characteristics that suggest the existence of imperfect vertical price 
transmission. Specifically, while a portion of grapes are purchased and enter the 
distribution channel as wine grapes for non-PDO wines, they are later redirected 
towards the production of PDO wine. Also, the role of cooperatives, though relevant in 
absolute terms is smaller relative to other food sectors. These facts, coupled with the 
significant role played by supermarkets that usually exert strong market power, 
contribute to help understand why farm-gate prices decline while consumer prices 
remain stable.  
 
Other causes are identified by experts in the first-round qualitative assessment as 
causing imperfect price transmission along the marketing chain. These causes are the 
scarce development of contractual regimes among agents, poor vertical integration and 
abnormal margins among certain distributors. Moreover, experts reveal that, even 
though the public administration is aware of these problems, efforts put forward to help 
the sector to prevent them are very limited.  
 
Qualitative results from the Delphi study allow us to point to the main causes 
responsible for the current production surplus affecting the sector: the lack of 
coordination and poor market integration in the overall Catalan wine sector, deficiencies 
in the public regulation of the sector, a slow down in exports and domestic sales and 
finally an increase in production so as to maintain farm income levels in a context of 
price declines. Interestingly, experts identify this situation as being a structural 
phenomenon for white and red wine, whilst for Cava it seems to be only a temporary 
condition. Moreover, experts are more concerned about red than white wine due to the 
bulk-export possibility for the latter.   
 
Based on the results from the Delphi survey, several policy and managerial 
implications emerge. It seems interesting to implement polices that help to improve 
integration for all stages of wine production, from grape growing to wine selling. This 
implies reducing the number of intermediaries and promoting a high level of 
professionalization within the sector. Vertical integration may help to reduce margin 
concentration at certain levels of the marketing chain. It would also be useful to 
standardize the parameters that are taken into account to define the quality of grapes by 
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wine makers, and to promote the economic compensation for quality production. This 
latter measure could induce a reduction in overproduction.  
 
The slow down in demand both at the national and international levels seems to be a 
result of poor knowledge of Catalan wines which limits the chances to introduce them 
in foreign markets. Some experts argue in favor of promoting an agreement among 
PDOs regarding promotional strategies along with supports from public authorities. 
This would imply less competition among PDOs, more consumer information about 
Catalan wines and thus a likely increase in domestic consumption and/or exports.  
 
 Moreover, the impending EU wine market reform can help reducing overproduction 
since it will ban the use of sugar for enriching wine. This will have a positive impact on 
quality payment differentiations and is likely to reduce overproduction. Also, better 
labelling rules and a budget for promoting information campaigns for wines with 
Geographical Indications is likely to positively affect grape for PDO wine payments. 
However, the elimination of market management measures, such as crisis distillation 
can have a negative impact on overproduction.  
 
The first limitation of this study is associated with the Delphi method. Implementing 
the Delphi questionnaire is time consuming and this implies that not many rounds can 
be developed. Another important limitation is the lack of transparency within the 
Catalan wine sector, making it complex to extract information from the agents involved 
and limits the availability of experts to participate in the study. Indeed, a bigger expert 
panel would help in making a more accurate diagnosis of the situation of the sector. 
Finally, some of the data required, such as farm-level economic data, are not easily 
available making it even more difficult to gain a deeper understanding of the situation of 
the sector.      
 18
 
References  
 
ACNielsen, (2006a), “Resultados del estudio sobre la imagen y posicionamiento de la DO 
calificada  rioja en el mercado nacional e internacional”, Available at:  
http://www.riojawine.com/es/actualidad/noticias/noticias/media2006/graficosnielsen200
6.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
 
ACNielsen, (2006b), “El Mercat del Vi, informe desembre - gener 2006”, available at:  
http://www.gencat.net/darp/c/incavi/doc/inform.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
 
Agrafiotis, D. and Vagianou-Angelaki, D. (1999), “Biotechnology and Agro-Food sector: 
Assessment of Environmental Impacts and the Questions of Sustainability”, Paper 
presented at the 1st POSTI workshop, the Annual ESST Scientific Conference, 
Lausanne, Switzerland, 29-30 May.   
 
Barrère, C. (2007), “The genesis, evolution and crisis of an institution: the Protected 
Designation of Origin in wine markets”, Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol.3 No. 
2, pp 165-181.  
 
Bukenya, J. and Labys, W.C. (2007), “Do fluctuations in wine stocks affect wine prices?”,  
American association of wine economics working paper, No.8, available at: 
http://www.wine-economics.org/workingpapers/AAWE_WP08.pdf (accesed  November 
2007).    
 
Calderon, M. and Blanco, L. (2005), “Análisis multivariado aplicado al mercado mundial  de    
vinos”, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Asociación Argentina de 
Economía Política, 16-18 November, La Plata, Argentina,  available at:   
http://www.aaep.org.ar/espa/anales/works05/calderon_blanco.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
 
Cámaras de Comercio, Database, available at: http://aduanas.camaras.org/ (accessed May 2007). 
 
Catalan Department of Agriculture (DAR) (n.d.), “Preus percebuts pel pagès, Catalunya 2000-
2007. Base 2000”, available at : 
http://www.gencat.net/darp/c/dades/preupp/preupp04.htm (accesed November 2007). 
 
Confederación General de Cooperativas Agrarias de la UE (COGECA) (2005), “Las 
Cooperativas Agrarias en Europa. Cuestiones Fundamentales i Tendencias”, available 
at: http://www.ccae.es/ficheros/doc/01470.pdf (accessed May  2007). 
 
Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias En España, “Cooperativismo en cifras”,  available at: 
http://www.ccae.es/ (accessed  May 2007). 
 
Critcher, C. and Gladstone, B. (1998), “Utilizing the Delphi Technique in Policy Discussion: a 
Case Study of a Privatized Utility in Britain”, Public Administration, Vol.76, pp. 431-
49. 
 
Fogarty, J. (2004), “The Own-Price Elasticity of Alchohol: A Meta-analysis”, Working paper, 
The University of Western Australia Business School. available at: 
http://www.biz.uwa.edu.au/home/research/discussionworking_papers/economics/2004?f
=150991%20- (accessed October 2007) 
 
 
 19
Fondo espanyol de Garantía Agraria (FEGA) (n.d), “Recapitulación de las declaraciones de 
existencias de vinos de mesa y V.C.P.R.D.”, available at: 
http://www.fega.es/fgpweb/fgp_inicio (accessed November 2007)  
 
FORO AGRARIO (2000), La reforma de la PAC de la Agenda 2000 y la Agricultura Española, 
Mundi-Prensa, Madrid. 
 
Garcia, A.M., Oreja, J.R. and Gonzalez, E. (2002), “Las relaciones verticales y el poder de 
negociación de los agricultores integrados en forma de cooperativa frente a los 
individuales”, CIRIEC-España, Revista de Economía Pública, Social y Cooperativa, 
Vol.41, pp. 111-137. 
 
Goodwin, B. K. and Holt, M. T. (1999), “Price Transmission and Asymmetric Adjustment in 
the U.S. Beef Sector”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81 No.3, pp. 
630-637. 
 
ICEX, Oficina Económica y Comercial del Consulado General de España en Dusseldorf (2006), 
“Estudio de mercado: El mercado del vino en Alemania”, available at:  
http://cendoc.esan.edu.pe/exportar/textocompleto/vino.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
 
Milholland, A.V., Wheeler, S.G. and Heeiec, J.J. (1973), “Medical Assessment by a Delphi 
Group Opinion Technique”, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 288, pp. 1272-5. 
 
Mili, S. and Rodríguez, M. (2001), “Exploring Future Developments in International Olive Oil 
Trade and Marketing: A Spanish Perspective”, Agribusiness, Vol. 17 No.3, pp. 397-
415. 
 
Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca i Alimentación (MAPAa), (n.d.), “Anuarios de estadística 
agroalimentaria, 2003; 2004 and 2006”, available at:  http://www.mapa.es/ (accessed 
May 2007). 
 
Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación (MAPAb), 
(2000;2001;2002;2003;2004;2005;2006), La alimentación en España,  Madrid.  
 
Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación (MAPA) (2004), “Estudio sobre la 
comercialización agroalimentaria en el sector cooperativo español”, available at:  
http://www.mapa.es/ (accessed May 2007). 
 
International organization of vine and wine (OIV) (1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003 and 2004), 
“Situation and statistics of the world vitiviniculture sector”, available at:   
http://www.oiv.int/ (accessed May 2007). 
 
Institut d’estadística de Catalunya (Idescat) (2003 and 2005), “Enquesta sobre l’estructura de les 
explotacions agrícoles”,  available at:  www.idescat.net (accessed May 2007). 
 
Oranga, H.M. and Nordberg, E. (1993), “The Delphi Panel method for Generating Health 
Information”, Health Policy and Planning, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 405-12.  
 
Padel, S. and Midmore, P. (2005), “The development of the European Market for organic 
products: insights from a Delphi study”, British Food Journal, Vol. 107 No.8, pp. 626-
617.  
 
 20
Peltzman, S. (2000), “Prices Rise Faster Than They Fall”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
108 No. 3, pp. 466-502.  
 
Rikkonen, P., Aakkula, J. and Kaivo-Oja, J. (2006), “How can Future Long Term Changes in 
Finnish Agriculture and Agricultural Policy de Faced? Defining Strategic Agendas on 
the Basis of a Delphi Study”, European Planning Studies, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 147-67. 
 
Salazar, M. and Sayadi, S. (2006), “El Delphi como Método de Análisis de la Coherencia de la 
PAC desde la prespectiva social”, Paper presented at the IX Encuentro de Economía 
Aplicada, 8-9-10 June, Jaen, Spain.  
 
Sackman, H. (1975), Delphi critique, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA. 
 
Sheibe, M. Skutsch, M. and Schofer, J. (2002), “Experiments in Delphi Methodology”, in 
Linstone, H.A. and Turoff, M. (2002), The Delphi Method: Techniques and 
Applications, available at:  http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ (accessed November 
2007). 
 
Soliño, M. (2003), “Programas Forestales en las Comunidades de Montes Vecinales en Mano 
Común de la Red Natura 2000: un Análisis Delphi”, Revista Gallega de Economía, Vol. 
12 No. 1, pp. 225-246.  
 
Serra, T. and Goodwin, B.W. (2003), “Price Transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the 
Spanish dairy sector”, Applied Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 1889-1899. 
 
Shoeman, M.E.F. and Mahajan, V. (1977), “Using the Delphi Method to Asses Community 
Health Needs”, Technology Forecasting and Social Changes, Vol. 10, pp. 203-10.     
 
Stewart, T. R. (1987), “The Delphi technique and judgmental forecasting”, Climatic Change, 
Vol.11, pp. 97–113. 
 
Turoff, M. (2002), “The Policy Delphi”, in  Linstone, H.A. and Turoff, M. (2002), The Delphi 
Method: Techniques and Applications, available at:  http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ 
(accessed May 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
 Figures  
 
Figure 1. Spanish wine consumption and Catalan wine consumption and production.  
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Source: Source: Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación (MAPA a,b) and Fondo Espanyol de de 
Garantía Agraria (FEGA) (n.d).  
 
Figure 2. Evolution of Catalan farm-gate wine prices and Catalan and Spanish retail 
wine prices (In constant currency units)  
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Figure 3. Catalan red wine supply chain diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
Vinery 
 
Cooperatives 
Wine cellar for storing and marketing     
Grape 
Concentrated 
grape must 
Export 
In bulk cellars 
Aged wine with PDO 
 (22.2%) 
Young wine with 
PDO 
 (49.5%) 
Young wine  (86.1%) 
Bottling cellars  
 
Super/hypermarket 
Wine store 
Bottling cellars 
Bottled non-
PDO wine 
(11.8%) 
In bulk wine 
(7.6%) 
Export 
Super/hypermarket 
Restaurant 
Aging Cellars  
Non-PDO wine 
Young wine with PDO 
 
Imported 
non-PDO 
wine 
Young wine with PDO 
Restaurant 
Distillation 
Concentrated 
grape must 
 
Wine Cellar   Distillation 
 
42.2 
(22) 
2.8 
(2.1) + 
= 
100 
48.3 
(20.9) 
6.7 
(13.7) 
+ 
 46.1 
(14.4) 
 37.7 
(16.7) 
 48.5 
(16.7) 
  4.9 
 (4.9) 
 23.2 
(14.9)  
 22.2 
(10.2) 
  26.3 
(10.2) 
  6.9 
 (2.5) 
 5.6 
(3.3) 
 3.9 
(2) 
 5.8 
(3.1) 
  13.4 
 (5.4) 
  16.5 
 (6.4) 
 7.6 
(4.2) 
11.8 
(4.8) 
 5.5  
(1.8) 
 4  
(1.4) 
  3.1 
 (2.3) 
  4.5 
 (2.3) 
 
  14.5 
 (8.8) 
  2.3 
 (1.7) 
 5  
(3) 
 40 
(2.7) 
 8.9 
(12) 
 11.1 
(5.12) 
  8.5 
 (5) 
 
Source: own source 
Note: Values are expressed in % and are at the data means. Standard deviations are in parenthesis 
 23
Figure 4. Catalan white wine supply chain diagram.   
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Notes 
 
[1]
 These designations are Alella, Catalunya (recently created), Conca de Barberà, 
Costers del Segre, Empordà-Costa Brava, Montsant, Penedès, Pla del Bages, Priorat, 
Tarragona and Terra Alta. Cava (sparkling wine) is another important PDO in 
Catalonia. Although it is not circumscribed to this autonomous community, 95% of its 
production is located there.   
[2]
 Other upublished papers using the Delphi technique to analize the Spanish 
agricultural sector are Salazar and Sayadi (2006) and Soliño (2003).  
[3]
 More detail on expert responses is available from the authors upon request. 
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